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Interim smallpox guidelines for the United Kingdom
Developing new policies from old evidence
Last week, the Department of Health in Londonpublished interim guidelines for responding to adeliberate release of smallpox in the United
Kingdom.1 2 The guidelines describe contingency plans
for diagnosis and management of the first cases,
vaccination strategies before and in the event of an out›
break, and other essential measures to ensure outbreak
preparedness and control. Two of us (RH and DM) have
contributed to the development of the guidelines, and
the aim of this editorial is to give a brief summary and
highlight some of the underlying evidence. (Comments
on the guidelines may be sent to smallpoxplan@
doh.gsi.gov.uk before the end of this year.)
Developing policies to combat an eradicated
infectious disease is difficult for two reasons. Firstly, it is
impossible to balance the benefits and risks of interven›
tions against the potential risk from disease. No one
knows whether variola virus exists outside the two labo›
ratories approved by the World Health Organization,
whether it has fallen into the hands of organisations or
individuals with the will and ability to use it as a weapon,
or whether it can actually be disseminated in a way that
would cause mass casualties. Secondly, the underlying
evidence relies on historical data, which were collected
in a different, now outdated context and are often
incomplete. Nevertheless, analysis of historical data has
provided valuable insights into the disease and the
importance and effectiveness of different interventions,
and several key messages have emerged that have been
used to develop contingency plans.
Rapid diagnosis of the first cases is essential. Any
delay in implementing control measures would
substantially increase the size of an outbreak.3 The last
naturally occurring case of smallpox in the United
Kingdom dates back to 1973, and most clinicians are
now unfamiliar with the presenting symptoms and
signs. To facilitate early diagnosis, under the United
Kingdom guidelines all clinicians will be issued with a
diagnostic algorithm to help them recognise and
assess cases of suspicious illness. Further clinical
pictures are available through the website of the Public
Health Laboratory Service (www.phls.org.uk). A cadre
of vaccinated doctors specialising in infectious diseases
will provide diagnostic support, and emergency small›
pox response teams will be established to carry out fur›
ther assessment, laboratory investigation, and manage›
ment of suspected cases. A small number of specialist
laboratory staff will be vaccinated and trained in the
laboratory diagnosis of orthopox viruses.
The most appropriate vaccine strategy remains the
subject of debate. Three options might be considered:
pre›emptive mass vaccination,4 mass vaccination after a
release,5 and search and containment with tracing and
vaccination only of contacts of cases.6 Advocates of
pre›emptive vaccination probably have an overly pessi›
mistic view about the potential for disease transmission
and the effectiveness of control measures. Although
smallpox may be infectious from the onset of prodro›
mal symptoms, most transmissions have occurred from
patients with overt disease.7 In addition, transmission
usually required close contact with infected individuals:
attack rates were highest among household members,
although spread within hospitals has been docu›
mented.8 If smallpox were to re›emerge, infected
individuals would be extremely unwell by the time they
were highly infectious and therefore unlikely to
transmit infection extensively within the community.
Any vaccination strategy must consider the risk of
adverse events. The best historical estimates of adverse
event rates are from active surveillance in the United
States in the 1960s,9 when the crude death rate from
vaccination was about one in a million. However, when
the age and vaccination status of modern populations
is taken into account, the adjusted death rate is now
higher: it has been calculated that in France
(population 60 million), a universal vaccination
strategy would result in around 300 deaths and 18 500
serious adverse events.10 In addition, some groups have
a special risk of vaccine related complications, notably
immunosuppression, eczema, and pregnancy. The
emergence of HIV and the use of immunosuppressive
drugs have produced a greater number of susceptible
people in modern populations.
In the absence of smallpox anywhere in the world,
the overriding concern must be to minimise harm.
Pre›emptive vaccination in the United Kingdom will be
therefore limited to a few hundred specialist healthcare
workers who would be involved in the assessment and
management of the first cases. They will be carefully
screened for contraindications to minimise the risk of
adverse events. Further essential personnel will be
identified who could be vaccinated as part of a second
tranche in the event of a heightened threat or a
confirmed case of smallpox in the United Kingdom.
Two recent models have produced conflicting
recommendations about the most appropriate vaccina›
tion strategy in the event of the re›emergence of
smallpox. This is due in part to different assumptions
about how populations mix. Kaplan et al assumed that
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everyone has an equal chance of contact with anyone
else, and their model preferred a vaccination strategy
that included large swathes of the population.5 Halloran
et al assumed that individuals mix largely within close
social networks, and their results showed that a search
and containment strategy, such as that recommended by
WHO and used during the eradication campaign, would
be preferable.6
The United Kingdom has opted for search and con›
tainment, with wider vaccination initiated only if an out›
break is multicentred or uncontrolled. Vaccination
centres will be identified that could be operational within
24 hours if necessary. The United Kingdom’s vaccina›
tion strategy will be reviewed as results from more
sophisticated mathematical models emerge, and in the
event of an outbreak these models will be used in real
time to assess whether the adopted strategy is proving
adequate to control the transmission of infection.
Vaccination alone will not control an outbreak
without concurrent isolation of cases and monitoring
and observation of contacts.3 5 6 In the United
Kingdom, smallpox care centres will be identified that
could be used to treat patients and observe febrile con›
tacts. In addition, the clinical and public health
infrastructure required for tracing and monitoring of
contacts will be identified in advance.
The United States has also published guidelines for
responding to smallpox,11 and other countries in Europe
and North America are in the process of developing
contingency plans and securing access to supplies of
vaccine. Poorer countries have neither a public health
infrastructure capable of responding rapidly to an
outbreak, nor stocks of vaccine or the capability to pro›
duce vaccine. In many of these, overcrowding and a high
prevalence of HIV would favour the spread of infection.
This raises the question of whether and how these coun›
tries would obtain the support and resources, including
supplies of vaccine that would be essential for smallpox
control. A case of smallpox anywhere in the world would
represent a global health emergency.
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Evaluating treatment effects reliably
Although principles are well known, they are ignored too often
The introduction, more than half a century ago, ofproperly randomised trials in which the treat›ment allocation was rigorously concealed was a
watershed in the evaluation of treatment effects.1 But this
major advance did not come out of the blue: as was
highlighted at a recent conference in Oxford (Beating
biases in therapeutic research: historical perspectives,
www.wuhmo.ox.ac.uk/docs/BeatingBiases.html),
attempts to combat bias in therapeutic evaluation had in
fact been made during the preceding few centuries.2–4
In the 18th century, the traditional practice of
claiming therapeutic achievement on the basis of
pathophysiological theories and anecdotal “successes”
started to be challenged by medical non›conformists
who wrote careful, prospective, analytical accounts of
medical treatments, some of which included com›
parison with a control group.4 These “arithmetic
observationists and experimentalists”4 recognised the
need to avoid inappropriate inference of cause and
effect in therapeutics and realised that bias may be
introduced by, among other things, selecting patients
for particular treatments (selection bias) and reporting
only particularly successful treatments (publication
bias).
One innovation aimed at reducing selection bias was
to alternate patients in a consecutive series between
treatment and no treatment.1 But alternation had the
major limitation that the investigator knew which
treatment the next patient would receive, and this
knowledge could influence whether a particular patient
was considered suitable for the study.1 In the 1930s,
Bradford Hill realised that properly executed randomi›
sation would reduce this potential for selection bias by
ensuring that treatment groups were balanced with
respect to both measured and unmeasured prognostic
variables. This insight underpinned the first trials in
which treatment allocation was randomised and
rigorously concealed: a trial of immunisation against
whooping cough, and a trial of streptomycin for pulmo›
nary tuberculosis, both conducted in the late 1940s.1
So is bias in therapeutic evaluation beaten? Sadly
not. Even though the fundamental methods for avoid›
ing bias in therapeutic research are well established,5 6
examples of studies with inappropriate designs still
occur. Importantly, many studies of treatment effects
still do not involve random allocation of the treatment
under study.5 Although in some circumstances such
non›randomised observational studies can provide
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